American criminal law is committed to some version of the doctrine of double effect ("DDE"). In this paper, I defend a new variant of the agent-centered rationale for a version of DDE that is of particular relevance to the criminal law. In particular, I argue for a non-absolute version of DDE that concerns the relative culpability of intending a bad or wrongful state of affairs as opposed to bringing it about merely knowingly. My aim is to identify a particular feature of the former in virtue of which it is pro tanto more culpable than the latter. Providing an agent-centered argument of this kind for a culpability version of DDE, I argue, is an especially attractive route to take for those who are interested in vindicating the way the criminal law actually encodes DDE.
opposed to bringing it about merely knowingly. My aim is to identify a particular feature of the former in virtue of which it is pro tanto more culpable than the latter.
In section 1, I formulate the version of DDE I will be concerned with and explain its relevance to the criminal law. Section 1 also explains why agent-centered rationales are especially attractive to those interested in the criminal law. In section 2, I sketch the basic argument for my culpability version of DDE. Section 3 refines the argument, while section 4 responds to objections. Section 5 wraps up by indicating how progress might be made on the socalled closeness problem. Although this problem ultimately might prove so intractable that the criminal law should be reformed to reject DDE, this is a conclusion I think we should adopt only as a last resort. I don't think we have to fall back to this position yet, though, since the argument I develop here gives reason to be optimistic that the criminal law's actual uses of DDE can be placed on a more secure normative foundation.
A Version of DDE for the Criminal Law
In this paper, I will focus on a non-absolutist, culpability-based version of DDE, and my argument for it is agent-centered. In this section, I explain why this sort of argument for this version of DDE is of particular interest to those seeking a normative foundation for the way the criminal law actually embodies DDE.
Why care about culpability-versions of DDE?
Different versions of DDE have been formulated using different normative concepts.
Sometimes it is construed as a claim about permissibility-i.e. a claim to the effect that for some harms, it is impermissible to bring them about intentionally, but permissible to bring them about as foreseen side-effects of one's conduct. 13 Sometimes DDE is formulated as a claim about 13 William FitzPatrick, The Doctrine of Double Effect: Intention and Permissibility, PHILOSOPHY COMPASS 7/3 (2012).
difficulty of justification-i.e. that it is harder to justify intentional harms than the analogous merely foreseen harms. 14 Others have understood DDE in terms of culpability, 15 which is the approach to formulating DDE I adopt here. (These different formulations of DDE of course might be related if the normative concepts they employ are connected in the right way.)
There are at least three reasons for those interested in the defensibility of existing criminal law to focus on a culpability version of DDE. First, the criminal law is often said to embody a culpability hierarchy. Modern criminal law employs four main mental states one might act with-negligence, recklessness, knowledge and purpose-each supposedly more culpable than the last. 16 Ken Simons notes that this hierarchy is embodied in the influential Model Penal Code ("MPC"):
The MPC views its four basic mental states or culpability terms as hierarchically ordered: all else being equal, purpose is more culpable than knowledge, which is more culpable than recklessness, which is more culpable than negligence. Indeed, the MPC explicitly provides that if a statute requires a mental state that is lower in the hierarchy, then an actor who possesses a higher mental state also satisfies that mental state requirement.
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If we are interested in whether this culpability hierarchy is defensible, we will want to know to what extent its claims about the relative culpability of these four mental states hold. The distinction between the top two mental states in the hierarchy-purpose and knowledgedirectly corresponds to the distinction in DDE. Thus, securing a culpability version of DDE would shore up the normative credentials of the culpability hierarchy.
A second, related reason to care about a culpability version of DDE is that showing it to be defensible would help explain certain criminal law doctrines. Most importantly, it would explain why it is sensible for the criminal law to condition guilt for certain crimes on having the purpose 14 Ralph Wedgwood, Defending Double Effect, 24 RATIO 384, 385-86 (2011) 179, 195-96 (2003) .
to bring about a prohibited state of affairs, while mere knowledge that it will result from one's conduct is not sufficient. As seen above, treason is one such crime. 18 But there are many others.
The crime of falsely incriminating another is defined as "giv [ing] false information to any law enforcement officer with purpose to implicate another." 19 It is an offense to harbor or conceal a person if done "with purpose to hinder the apprehension, prosecution, conviction or punishment of another for crime." 20 Likewise, it is an offense to "threaten[] unlawful harm to any person with purpose to influence his decision, opinion, recommendation, vote or other exercise of discretion as a public servant, party official or voter." 21 Attempt liability requires "purposely engage [ing] in conduct that would constitute the crime if the attendant circumstances were as
[the defendant] believes them to be." 22 Conspiracy and solicitation require acting with "the purpose of promoting or facilitating" the underlying crime.
23
A natural way to explain why being guilty of these crimes requires the mental state of purpose would be to claim that purposeful misconduct, all else equal, is more culpable than the analogous knowing misconduct. It is axiomatic that punishments must be deserved, and the amount of punishment deserved for a crime depends on the seriousness of the crime. Moreover, as Doug Husak points out, " [t] he seriousness of the crime…is partly a function of the culpability of the offender." 24 Thus, if a culpability version of DDE were shown to be defensible, it would explain why it can be sensible to single out some types of purposeful misconduct as meriting harsher punishment than the analogous merely knowing misconduct. CRIMINAL LAW 182 (2008) . 25 Of course, other explanations might be found. Perhaps purposeful misconduct is somehow more serious than the analogous merely knowing misconduct, although the former is no more culpable than the latter. I have doubts about this possibility. Still, my only point is that if we secure a culpability version of DDE, this would suffice to make A third reason to be interested in culpability versions of DDE will emerge in section 1.3, where I argue that certain problems for agent-centered rationales for DDE can be avoided by focusing on culpability, rather than other normative concepts.
A non-absolutist version of DDE
It is now standard to formulate DDE as a non-absolutist claim. 26 That is, rather than taking DDE to assert that intentionally causing a bad state of affairs always is all-things-considered worse (in the relevant sense) than doing so merely knowingly, DDE more plausibly asserts only that there is some respect in which the former is worse than the latter-e.g. that it is harder to justify 27 or that there is more pro tanto reason against it. 28 I follow this trend in this paper.
To illustrate the difficulty with the absolutist version of DDE, consider the challenge raised by some legal scholars against the distinction between the culpability hierarchy's top two levels:
purpose and knowledge. Larry Alexander has argued that purposeful criminal conduct is not "always more culpable than [conduct performed with] knowledge or recklessness." 29 He raises two cases that illustrate the point. For one, Alexander suggests that sometimes "a purposeful criminal actor who imposes a very tiny risk [of harm] is less culpable than a nonpurposeful actor who imposes huge risks for weak reasons." 30 The second example concerns a group of trapped spelunkers who believe they must kill and eat one member of the group to save the rest. Perhaps the spelunkers have a lesser evils justification, which might make their intentional killing seem less culpable than garden-variety knowing killings that are unjustified. But in response, the sense of the practice of punishing purposeful misconduct more harshly than analogous knowing misconduct. 26 See Nelkin & Rickless, supra note 10 at 11. Wedgewood also emphasizes the need to focus not on overall justifiability, but rather just on the bad-making features of one's conduct. See supra note at 14 at 385-86 (2011) . He, in turn, attributes the insight to Quinn. See supra note 11. 27 Nelkin & Rickless, supra note 10 at 13. 28 Wedgwood, supra note 14 at 384 (taking DDE to be the claim that there is "a stronger reason against an act if that act has a bad state of affairs…as one of its intended effects than if [it] is merely one of the act's unintended effects").
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Larry Alexander, Insufficient Concern: A Unified Conception of Criminal Culpability, 88 CAL. L. REV. 931, 943 (2000) . 30 Id.
defender of DDE could just restrict her claim that purposeful misconduct is worse than knowing misconduct to cases of unjustified action. Nonetheless, Alexander notes, even if the trapped spelunkers do not have any justification for their conduct (suppose they in fact needn't kill anyone to survive), they still seem less culpable than "those who impose high risks of death on others for the mere thrill of it but who do not have others' deaths as their conscious object." 31 This, then, would be an example of an unjustified, purposeful killing that is on-balance less culpable than an unjustified, merely foreseen killing.
Alexander seems correct on this score. But non-absolutist versions of DDE are consistent with Alexander's point that not all cases of purposefully causing harm (or more generally, a bad or wrongful state of affairs) are more culpable than doing so merely knowingly. To formulate DDE so it is consistent with Alexander's point, we should focus not on the overall culpability of an action, but rather on the various contributors to culpability-i.e. the action's culpabilityenhancing features. This yields the following non-absolutist, culpability version of DDE (which I'll restrict in one further way shortly): DDE NAC : If P1 does A1 intending to bring about a state of affairs that is bad or wrongful to degree X and P2 does an otherwise identical action, A2, not intending, but merely knowing (foreseeing) that it will bring about a state of affairs that is bad or wrongful to degree X, then this is one respect in which P1 is more culpable for doing A1 than P2 is for doing A2 (i.e. it makes A1 pro tanto more culpable than A2).
In other words, A1 has a culpability-enhancing feature, F1, in virtue of being done with the intention to bring about a bad or wrongful state of affairs, while A2 has a different culpabilityenhancing feature, F2, in virtue of being done while foreseeing that it will bring about such a state of affairs, and F1 adds to the culpability of A1 more than F2 adds to the culpability of A2. This is consistent with A2 still being on-balance more culpable than A1 (provided all else is no longer equal). After all, the pro tanto greater culpability that A1 has in virtue of possessing F1 31 Id. (emphasis added).
rather than F2 can be outweighed by other culpability-enhancing features of A2, which A1 does not possess. For example, perhaps A1 is on-balance justified while A2 is not. Or perhaps P1 is aware of some additional considerations that justify A1 somewhat but not fully, while these considerations do not apply to A2 at all. This would be a case where both A1 and A2 are unjustified, but A2 is still on-balance more culpable than A1.
32 DDE NAC is consistent with such cases, and so it accommodates Alexander's point that sometimes purposefully harming is onbalance less culpable than doing so only knowingly. 33
Why agent-centered rationales are of particular interest for the criminal law
Now that we have a plausible culpability version of DDE in view, we can ask which rationale for it seems most promising-an agent-centered or a victim-centered rationale. Victim-centered rationales are becoming increasingly popular. 34 For instance, Nelkin and Rickless argue that "the best rationale for [DDE] is the 'means' rationale, according to which it is wrong to use others as means without their consent." 35 The means rationale is victim-centered in that it is "grounded in the fact that persons have a right not to be caught up, to their disadvantage, in the harmful direct 32 To illustrate, notice that the following pair of cases is no counterexample to DDE NAC . In Case 1, P1 intentionally kills innocent victim, V, in order to save P1's son from being tortured for an afternoon. An evil tyrant will refrain from torturing P1's son iff V dies by P1's hand. Thus, P1 shoots V intending to cause V's death. Suppose that this killing isn't actually justified, although it nearly is. In Case 2, a trolley is careening down the track towards a fourleaf clover, and to prevent it from getting squished, P2 redirects the trolley onto another track to which V is bound. P2 acts while merely knowing that he will cause V's death. Still , P2's act is much more culpable than P1's act. DDE NAC isn't undermined by these cases. This is because P1 perceives additional reasons that help justify his action (although they don't fully justify it), but these considerations don't apply to P2. While there is one respect in which P1's action is more culpable than P2's (in virtue of P1 intending the death and P2 only foreseeing it), this is outweighed by another difference between them-namely, that the benefits of P1's action are so much greater than P2's action. Thus, P2's action is on-balance far worse than P1's. DDE NAC is compatible with this result because it just entails that there is one respect in which P1's act is worse than P2's. 33 One might object that because DDE NAC is not formulated in terms of on-balance culpability, it is too weak to be interesting. Nonetheless, it has implications about overall culpability provided all else is equal. Specifically, if we hold fixed the both the harm in question and the benefits the two actors are seeking, then we plausibly can say that intending harm is on-balance worse than merely foreseeing it. DDE NAC can be formulated accordingly. 34 Nelkin & Rickless, supra note 10 at [11] [12] [13] Nelkin & Rickless, So Close, Yet So Far: Why criminal law theorists everything they need.
A lingering challenge: the closeness problem
The agent-centered argument for DDE NACR I offer below will not solve all the challenges that such approaches to DDE face. In particular, the so-called closeness problem remains. It arises because of the difficulty in distinguishing effects that are intended from effects that are merely foreseen. 45 DDE NACR presupposes that some such distinction is tenable. However, many cases where the actor seems to intend a bad state of affairs might plausibly be redescribed so that this state of affairs now seems like a merely foreseen side-effect. If Jerry pushes George onto the tracks to prevent a trolley from killing five innocent people further down the tracks, it might initially seem plausible that Jerry intends to harm George. Nonetheless, Jerry might reply that he does not in fact intend to harm George-he merely intends to push George onto the tracks and thereby stop the trolley. Jerry would greatly prefer it if this neither killed nor harmed George.
Since many typical cases of intended harm admit of this sort of redescription, the category of intended bad effects seems so "close" to the category of merely foreseen effects that the distinction between the two threatens to collapse.
I will not attempt a complete solution to this problem here. Some solutions have been suggested, 46 though others are skeptical that a solution can be found. 47 Ultimately, the defensibility of DDE NACR depends on solving the closeness problem. Still, let me try to mitigate the force of the problem in three ways.
First, contra Nelkin and Rickless, the closeness problem seems no more problematic for the agent-centered rationale, and associated versions of DDE that use the intend/foresee distinction, than the analogous difficulty is for the means rationale. Nelkin and Rickless argue that a version of DDE that conforms to the means rationale avoids the closeness problem, and therefore is preferable to versions of DDE that track the intend/foresee distinction. 48 Following Quinn, Nelkin and Rickless distinguish between harmful direct agency, "in which harm comes to some victims, at least in part, from the agent's deliberately involving them in something in order to further his purpose precisely by way of their being so involved," and harmful indirect agency, "in which harm comes to some victims, but in which either nothing in that way is intended for Nonetheless, their proposal faces an analogous challenge: namely, distinguishing harmful direct agency from harmful indirect agency. This distinction depends on the intentions of the agent (which is crucial to securing their argument that intentions matter to wrongdoing).
However, to draw this distinction, we need to be able to decide whether the agent intends to directly involve others in his plans-i.e. whether the agent intends to use others for his own purposes-or whether "nothing is in that way intended for the victims"-i.e. whether the agent does not intend, but merely foresees that others will be affected. Thus, while Nelkin and Rickless are correct that their version of DDE "does not require that harm itself be intended for the behavior to be in the disfavored category," it still requires that the use of others be intended, rather than merely foreseen, in order to count as harmful direct agency. Accordingly, Nelkin and
Rickless's version of DDE, premised on the means rationale, seems to require meeting a challenge very close to the closeness problem. As a result, DDE NACR and my agent-centered rationale are no worse off on this score than versions of DDE grounded in the means rationale.
Hopefully, I can also do more to alleviate the force of the closeness problem for present purposes. Specifically, the second step I want to take in this direction is to focus on pairs of cases in which the sort of redescription that fuels the closeness problem is not plausible. Consider this pair of cases where the problematic redescription seems unavailable:
Arson 1: Tony, a mob boss, offers to pay Alan $5000 to burn down a building, but it has to be done before midnight or Alan won't get paid. Alan agrees. He arrives at the building at 11:30pm, and as he is about to light the fire, he sees that Victor is doing something on the second floor. Victor does not leave, so Alan proceeds to light the fire knowing (i.e. while practically certain) that this will lead to Victor's death. As expected, Victor dies. Alan finds it regrettable that Victor dies, but he decides there's nothing he could do-he "really needed the money."
Arson 2: This case is as similar to Arson 1 as can be, except that now Tony offers to pay Bobby $5000 to see to it that Victor dies tonight before midnight. Moreover, Bobby is to kill Victor by making it look like he was killed by a fire in the building. Tony will not give Bobby the money unless Victor actually dies. (Suppose Tony has a perfectly reliable method for determining this.) Just before midnight, Bobby lights the building on fire and Victor dies.
Bobby finds it regrettable that Victor dies, but he decides there's nothing he could do-he "really needed the money."
Arson 1 is a merely foreseen (knowing) killing, while Arson 2 is a case in which the killing is intended-specifically, intended as the means to obtaining the $5000. Bobby acts with the purpose to bring about Victor's death, while Alan merely knows that his act will cause the death.
Moreover, in Arson 2, since Victor's death is necessary for Bobby to get paid, the case cannot plausibly be re-described as one in which Bobby does not intend Victor's death, but merely foresees it. Thus, Arson 1 & 2 is a pair of cases where the distinction between intended harm and merely foreseen harm appears to be relatively stable, and not liable to collapse.
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Granted, the difference between these cases does not matter from the legal perspective, since both Alan and Bobby would be guilty of murder, a crime that requires only knowledge. distinction between intended and merely foreseen effects will not be this stable. Often, the bad 52 One might worry that the closeness problem still arises even in this pair of cases. After all, in Arson 2, Bobby might insist that he didn't actually intend to kill Victor, but rather only intended to make it appear as though Victor were dead, so he would receive the $5000. But this worry is blocked by certain stipulations about the case. Specifically, we're supposing that Tony has a perfectly reliable method of detecting whether Victor in fact is dead. Thus, Tony cannot be fooled into thinking that Victor dies when in fact he survives. Given this stipulation, Bobby will have to aim at Victor's death itself. Bobby will be unable to maintain that in fact he only aimed to make it appear as though Victor died. 53 Here is the treason analog of Arson 1. Suppose that Fritz, an operative for the Axis powers during WWII, offers to pay Alan $5000 to burn down a military building by starting an electrical fire, but it has to be done before midnight or Alan won't get paid. Alan agrees. He arrives at the building at 11:30pm, and as he is about to light the fire, he sees that the building contains a shipment of technical schematics whose destruction would hurt the US war effort.
No one arrives to cart away the technical schematics before midnight, so Alan proceeds to light the fire knowing that this will end up aiding an enemy of the U.S. As expected, the schematics are destroyed in the fire. Alan finds it regrettable that he thus aided the enemy, but he decides his hands were tied-he "really needed the money. we eventually figure out how to draw a clear-cut distinction, applicable even to real-life cases, between genuinely intended and merely foreseen effects, the hope is that my argument will still go through. In this way, I aim to offer a rationale for DDE NACR while sidestepping (or postponing) the need to provide a general solution to the closeness problem.
The third mitigating point I want to make is that the substance of the argument offered below for DDE NACR will end up giving some practical guidance for how to proceed in real life cases where the distinction between intention and foresight is unclear. Specifically, it indicates what sort of evidence to look for to decide whether a given bad effect is intended or merely foreseen. I return to this point in Section 5. A second way in which Alan's lack of commitment makes his motivational profile different from Bobby's has to do with the further steps they would be inclined to take to ensure that Victor dies. Suppose that Victor miraculously does not die in the fire. Given that Alan is not committed to the death, he would not be inclined to take additional steps to see to it that Victor really dies.
An Agent-Centered Rationale for the Criminal Law's Version of DDE
By contrast, in Arson 2, if Victor does not initially die from the fire, Bobby would feel some inclination to take further steps to ensure that he dies (at least assuming Bobby does not change his mind, become irrational, etc.). After all, in Arson 2, for Bobby to achieve his aim of getting the $5000 for killing Victor, it really is necessary that Victor dies.
More generally, I claim that when one intends a harm, either as an end or as a means, one is actually somewhat committed to it in this sense:
Commitment: P is somewhat committed to bringing about a state of affairs, S, iff P's motivational profile is such that, in scenarios where P's ends remain the same as they actually are and S retains the same instrumental or constitutive relationship to those ends that S has in the actual world, P would experience at least some motivational pressure to seek out and take steps that appear to him to promote 55 the occurrence of S (e.g. by making S more likely than if those steps had not been taken)-at least provided those steps are not too costly, P does not suffer from execution-failure or irrationality, and so on. The broader the range of cases in which P would feel motivational pressure to take steps that promote S, and the stronger this felt motivational pressure is, the more committed P is to bringing about S.
While I suggest that intending harm makes one at least somewhat committed to bringing about the harm in this sense, the same is not true for merely foreseen harm.
One clarification. Both Alan and Bobby are similar in this respect: if there were an alternative course of conduct they could take that would easily secure the desired $5000, but that would not result in Victor's death, they both would take that action instead. This is because Alan is not committed to the death at all, and Bobby does not intend the death as an end in itself, but 55 I understand the promotion relation as Schroeder describes it: "X's doing A promotes p just in case it increases the likelihood of p relative to some baseline. And the baseline, I suggest, is fixed by the status quo." MARK SCHROEDER, SLAVES OF THE PASSIONS 113 (2007) . Here, the relevant baseline is S's likelihood of occurring in a case that is exactly like the actual world in which the contemplated additional steps are not taken-i.e. in which one's action A is performed but the extra steps are not. rather only as the means to getting $5000. Thus, not even Bobby is committed to the harm in all possible worlds. Nonetheless, this is consistent with Bobby's being committed to the harm in the above sense. After all, a case in which Bobby can obtain the $5000 without killing Victor-call it Free Money-is not one in which the killing is instrumentally related to Bobby's ends in just the same way as it is in the actual scenario, i.e. Arson 2. Accordingly, my claim here does not entail that Bobby would feel any motivational pressure to take steps to ensure Victor's death in Free Money. Rather, my only claim is that in cases where the killing does remain instrumentally necessary to Bobby's getting paid the $5000, just as it is in the actual world (i.e. Arson 2), Bobby would feel motivational pressure to take steps to make Victor's death more likely. That is the sense, I claim, in which Bobby is committed to Victor's death, but Alan is not.
Accordingly, what seems to underlie DDE NACR is the idea that there is something especially culpable about being committed to causing a given harm in the way that Bobby is in Arson 2.
But it will not do to merely assert that such a commitment renders one more culpable. Some explanation is needed.
The explanation I propose employs a familiar theory of culpability. Its basic thought is that one is culpable for an action to the extent it manifests insufficient regard for the interests of others (or perhaps more generally, for morally relevant interests). 56 More precisely:
Insufficient Regard Theory: P is culpable for her action, A, to the extent that A manifests P's insufficient regard for morally relevant interests-or equivalently, the extent to which A demonstrates that P has failed, in her motivational processes, to give due weight to the normative reasons she actually has (and has access to based on her evidence) in the circumstances. Thus, if you do some action that on-balance there is reason not to do, and you reasonably could and should have appreciated that the reasons against the action outweigh the reasons in favor of it, then you have acted in a way that manifests your insufficient regard for morally relevant interests (unless excused). Moreover, this view incorporates a certain principle of lenity, which will become crucial when I refine the argument later. I will explain the point in more detail then.
But for now, the thought behind this principle of lenity is that the amount of insufficient regard manifested by an action is equal to only the minimum amount that it is necessary to postulate in order to explain why the actor behaved as she did under the circumstances. (More on this below.
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) Although my argument is formulated in terms of the insufficient regard theory in order to fix concepts and enhance clarity, this should not make the argument overly controversial. For this already prevalent theory is similar in spirit to a range of other theories of culpability. 58 Thus, I suspect my argument can be translated into the terminology of other theories (although I will not argue for that here). Strictly speaking, though, my argument depends on some version of the insufficient regard theory, or a related theory, proving true. Now, the rationale for DDE NACR is that intending, and thus being committed to causing, a given harm manifests more insufficient regard for others, all else equal, than merely foreseeing that one's action will cause that harm, without being committed to it. Why might this be so?
The basic idea is that when you know, or foresee, that a particular action of yours, A, will cause a given harm, then your conduct manifests insufficient regard in one way, while when you intentionally cause harm, and thus are committed to it in the above sense, your conduct manifests 57 See infra note 74 and accompanying text. 58 The insufficient regard theory is similar in spirit to the theory that an action is culpable to the degree that "it is a product of a faulty mode of recognition or response to reasons for action." GIDEON YAFFE, ATTEMPTS 38 (2011 That is, your act demonstrates that promoting the harm is something to which you are affirmatively attracted more than you ought to be, assuming the harm is unjustified. Since acting with the commitment to harm involves two manifestations of insufficient regard, while merely knowing or foreseen harm involves only one, the insufficient regard theory entails that there is a respect in which the first actor will be more culpable for his conduct than the second is for hers.
A More Precise Defense of the Argument
This, then, is the basic line of thinking that I claim supports DDE NACR . However, the argument must be refined in light of a number of complications. I begin by clarifying the picture of motivation I am working with. Plausibly, when you do an action, A, you take it that there are certain reasons in favor of A-call them "R+"-and you may or may not take it that there are certain reasons against A-call them "R-." I am supposing that to "take it" that there is a reason in favor of A is to experience some motivational pressure towards doing A, while to "take it"
that there is a reason against A is to feel somewhat motivationally repelled from doing it. Given this picture, let me precisely state my argument-I call it the "Two Strikes Argument"-before defending each of its premises.
The Two Strikes Argument: 1) If you do A with the intention that A help bring about a harm (or more generally a bad or wrongful state of affairs)-call it H for short-then you act with at least some commitment to H (in the sense defined above). 2) If you do A while merely foreseeing (knowing) that it will cause an identical harm H, then in doing A you tolerate, but are not committed to H. 59 In general, I don't think that what matters to culpability is the absolute magnitude of the weight you attach to the reasons against your action. That is, it doesn't matter how strongly, in absolute terms, you feel motivational pressure against the action in virtue of the facts counting against it. Rather, what matters is how much weight you attach to the reasons against the action as compared with the weight attached to the reasons in favor of it. More on this below. 60 Note that my claim here is only that one "regards it as true" that R+>R-iff one does A provided one is rational and does not suffer from execution failure or the like. Still, this does not render my notion of "regarding it as true that R+>R-" is empty or explanatorily useless. On my view, "regarding it as true that R+>R-" means "feeling more motivational pressure in favor of A than against it." But this does not mean the same as "doing A (provided one is rational)." First, these terms clearly have different intensions, since the first concerns one's motivational processes, while the latter concerns behavior. Moreover, the two terms are not extensionally equivalent either. I can regard it as true that R+>R-in the sense that I feel more motivational pressure in favor of A than against it, but still fail to do A even though I'm rational. For instance, it's possible that just as I am about to do A, a mad scientist paralyzes my body. Cognitively, I am exactly as I was before being paralyzed-I remain fully conscious and have all the same mental states. Thus, I'm still rational. The paralysis simply blocks the execution of my intention. Thus, "regarding it as true that R+>R-" is also not co-extensive with "doing A (provided one is rational)."
3) If you do A with a commitment to H, then you display the following two distinctive faults provided neither your action A nor H itself is justified: a) you are insufficiently repelled by H, and b) you feel some motivational pressure to affirmatively promote H (i.e. adjust your conduct to make H more likely, take further steps to ensuring it, opt for alternatives that make it more likely, etc.), and this is more motivational pressure towards promoting H than you should experience. 4) By contrast, if in doing A you only tolerate but are not committed to H, then your conduct only manifests one of the two faults in 3): i.e. that you are insufficiently repelled by H (and insofar as you do happen to feel some attraction to H, this will not be manifested in your action in a way that bears on your culpability for A). 5) Thus, if you do A intending that it bring about H, then (assuming A and H are not justified) there is one respect in which A is more culpable than doing A while merely foreseeing that it will cause H (i.e. the former has a culpability-enhancing feature the latter lacks).
Premises 1) & 2)
I take premises 1) and 2) to be conceptual truths. For those who are skeptical of defending claims by calling them conceptual truths, 1) and 2) can be thought of as stipulative claims about how I understand the distinction between intending a state of affairs versus merely foreseeing it.
3) and 4) are the meat of the argument anyway.
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Still, I don't think 1) and 2) should be controversial. 62 The claim in 1)-that acting with the intention to bring about some state of affairs means one is committed, in the sense sketched in section 2, to that state of affairs (e.g. by behaving in ways that one sees as tending to promote it)-is similar in spirit to other accounts of the role intentions play in action. Others argue that intentions constitute commitments of various sorts. For example, Gideon Yaffe takes it that intending to X involves, inter alia, a commitment in the sense that one would be "criticizably irrational for failing to form an intention for, and thus a commitment to the occurrence of, those conditions that one believes to be necessary for the occurrence of X." 63 The sort of commitment 61 Even if the intending/foreseeing distinction does not perfectly line up with the distinction between commitment and its absence, I could still argue that the latter distinction is the one the criminal law should use. 62 Others endorse the view in 1) and 2), namely that intending an effect involves a commitment to it, while merely foreseeing it does not. I am concerned with here is an even weaker one than this. I take it that intending harm entails a commitment just in the sense that one will experience some motivational pressure to take apparently available steps to promote the harm in question, even if one actually does not decide to take those steps for other reasons (e.g. they are too costly). Thus, I think it's plausible that this is one type of commitment one has when acting with an intention to harm. This is hardly a complete defense of premise 1), but fully defending it would require too much of a detour into philosophy of action.
Similarly, I take it that 2) embodies a conceptual truth about merely foreseen harm. It seems that precisely what distinguishes actions done while merely foreseeing that they will cause harm from actions done with the intention to bring about such harm is that the former do not involve a commitment to the harm (in the above sense), while the latter do. 64 Instead, acting while merely foreseeing that it will result in harm shows only that one is willing to tolerate the harm in order to obtain the benefits of the action. Hence 2).
Premise 3a)
The argument's more substantive claims are premises 3) and 4). Start with 3a). Supposing you are indeed culpable for doing A-as would be the case when both A and the harm in question are clearly unjustified-this will be at least in part because you fail to be sufficiently repelled by the harm itself. If neither A nor the harm you are committed to causing thereby are reasonably seen as justified, then the harm in question should give you a motivating reason to refrain from doing A (i.e. it belongs in R-). But since you perform A anyway, this shows (assuming you're rational) that the harm did not repel you enough to get you to abstain from A.
Accordingly, since neither A nor the harm are justified, we know you attach too little weight to the reason against A that exists in virtue of the harm you're aware it will cause. Hence 3a).
To this, one might object that perhaps someone who is committed to bringing about a certain unjustified harm can really be sufficiently repelled by the harm. Suppose, for instance, you ought to be repelled by the intended harm to a certain degree-say, to degree 5 (to arbitrarily assign a number to it). Moreover, suppose you actually feel 5 units of repulsion to the harm. Nonetheless, you wrongly attach slightly greater weight to the reasons you take there to be in favor of the harm (which stem from the benefits the harm is the means to). Thus, you feel 6 units of attraction towards the harm and therefore are committed to bringing it about. But since you feel the required amount of repulsion to the harm (i.e. 5 units), wouldn't it be false to say that you are insufficiently repelled by it? What guarantee is there that someone who is committed to bringing about an unjustified harm will be insufficiently repelled by it-as opposed to merely being overly attracted to the perceived benefits of the harm?
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This objection fails because it relies on a mistaken picture of what it means to be insufficiently repelled by a particular consideration. The objection assumes that there is some absolute level of repulsion that one ought to feel towards a given harm. This is implausible because some actors are likely to have stormy inner lives and experience the various motivational pressures they are subject to much more strongly than other actors with more tranquil inner lives. Accordingly, it seems doubtful that there is an absolute level of strength or intensity of repulsion that one ought to feel towards particular harms. Instead, the level of repulsion one ought to feel towards a harm will depend in part on the strength of the other motivational pressures one is subject to. Suppose you all-things-considered ought not to do A because it would cause grave harm. If you are somewhat attracted to the harm because you think it would also lead to a modest benefit (say 2 units), then less motivational repulsion to the harm will be required to get you to behave as you ought than would be required in a different case 65 Thanks to Jon Quong for pressing me on this objection.
where you think the harm would lead to greater benefits (say, 3 units). Thus, the amount of motivational repulsion required to get you to do what you ought to-i.e. that counts as sufficient-depends on the other considerations you feel the pull of.
Thus, insufficient repulsion should be understood comparatively. Suppose the harm you are aware your action, A, will cause should give you a sufficient motivating reason not to do A, which is to say that R-in fact outweighs R+. But if you do A anyway, you thereby demonstrate that you regard R+ as outweighing R-(assuming you are rational). In these conditions, it follows that you will be insufficiently repelled by the harm in the sense that the weight attached to the harm as a reason not to do A was insufficient to get you to refrain from doing A. Furthermore, this does not turn insufficient repulsion into an empty notion because it means nothing more than not doing the right thing. 66 After all, one might be sufficiently repelled by a harm in the comparative sense but still fail to avoid causing it due to execution failure when trying to act as planned. 67 Moreover, even if insufficient repulsion and incorrect action are co-extensive when one is fully rational and there is no execution failure, the two notions would still have different intensions because one concerns action and the other concerns motivation. Thus, the notion of insufficient repulsion does not just collapse into that of incorrect action. Now return to the putative counter-example from above. We can see it poses no threat to premise 3a) when this comparative notion of insufficient repulsion is employed. Despite being substantially repelled by the harm (5 units), the actor was even more attracted to it (6 units) in virtue of the benefits she believed it would lead to. Nonetheless, she was still insufficiently repelled by the harm in the sense that her awareness of it should have given her a sufficient 66 Thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing me on this point. 67 For example, I might be appropriately motivated to dive into the freezing water to save a drowning child, but as I am about to dive, a prior trauma kicks in and paralyzes me, thus preventing me from acting as I am motivated to do. Accordingly, I would fail to do the right thing even though I am sufficiently repelled by the harm I would cause by not saving the child. Thus, insufficient repulsion is not simply defined as failing to do the right thing.
motivating reason to refrain from doing the harmful act-i.e. this was the job her motivational apparatus was called on to do-but in fact the only motivating reason the harm gave her against doing the action was insufficient to get her to avoid imposing the harm. Thus, this example is no threat to premise 3a)'s claim that when one is committed to bringing about an unjustified harm, one will be insufficiently repelled by it. (As we'll see in considering premise 4), the same holds for those who merely foresee that they will cause unjustified harm.)
Premise 3b)
When it comes to acting with the commitment to harming, however, this is not the end of the story. In addition to being insufficiently repelled, 3b) claims that when you act with some degree of commitment to causing the harm, this shows that you feel some affirmative motivational pressure, under the circumstances of the case, towards promoting the harm. That is, you feel some affirmative inclination to take steps, or make adjustments to your conduct, so as to make the harm more likely (i.e. more likely than it would be just given A without those steps or adjustments). 68 Another way to put it would be to say that your conduct is guided by your commitment to the harm. Your commitment pushes you, as it were, towards more effective means to bringing about the harm, were any available, under the circumstances of the case.
Moreover, even if no such steps are obviously available that would promote the harm more than your actual action A does, you will-in virtue of your commitment to the harm-still be on the lookout for such steps. After all, were they to reveal themselves, you would feel some motivational pressure to avail yourself of them. So even if none turns up, you still are guided by your commitment in the sense that you seek such more effective ways to bring about the harm.
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68 Alternatively, we might say that in virtue of your commitment to the harm, you would be rationally criticizable for failing to feel any motivational pressure towards promoting the harm. Either claim would do. 69 Hills and Bratman make similar claims. Hills thinks that intending a state of affairs, S, entails a commitment to S in the sense that one "chooses actions on the basis of their contribution" to bringing about S and "monitors" one's success at bringing it about. See Hills, supra note 54 at 135-36. It is this claim about monitoring that resembles my
This, in turn, shows that you take there to be reasons that count in favor of promoting the harm. For unless you took it that there was something that counted in favor of the harm itself (either intrinsically or because it is a means to something else you want), you would not be inclined to seek and take steps that appear to promote it. Thus, when you are committed to the harm, we know that you are drawn to the prospect of the harm and thus take its occurrence-or more precisely, the facts that seem to count in favor of the harm-as being included in the set of considerations that count in favor of A, viz. R+.
Thus, assuming both A and the harm to which you are committed are unjustified, you willin addition to being insufficiently repelled by the harm-display this second distinctive fault.
This is the fault of being affirmatively attracted to the prospect of the harm more than you should. Your commitment to the harm demonstrates that you attach some positive weight to considerations that either do not count in favor of the harm at all (and thus do not count in favor of A), or that only count in favor of the harm (and thus A) less strongly than you take them to,
given that the harm (and A) are unjustified. After all, by doing A with a commitment to the harm, you demonstrate that you take there to be sufficient reason to cause the harm, but in fact, by hypothesis, there is not: the harm is unjustified (as is A). Thus, any reasons there might be in favor of the harm actually support it less strongly than you take them to. Hence, you are more attracted to the harm than you should be.
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To this, one might object as follows. Suppose your act is itself on-balance unjustified, not because the harm you mean for it to cause is unjustified (suppose the harm is justified), but rather because of some other feature of the act that makes it on-balance unjustified. Perhaps the act is on-balance unjustified because it is a promise breaking, and although you also intend the claim about being on the lookout for ways to better promote the intended harm. Likewise, Bratman claims that "[i]n the normal case, one [who intends a given effect] is prepared to make adjustments in what one is doing in response to indications of one's success or failure in promoting" that effect. Bratman, supra note 54 at 141. 70 As with insufficient repulsion, over-attraction must also be understood comparatively.
harm you know it will cause, this harm itself is justified on independent self-defense grounds.
For instance, suppose your act will prevent someone from unjustly punching you in the face although it will harm your attacker, and your act also happens to amount to breaking a solemn promise. Thus, suppose the action is on-balance unjustified not because of the harm it will cause, but because of the overriding badness of breaching a solemn oath. Wouldn't this case-call it
Treacherous Self-Defense-be one in which you do not obviously overvalue the reasons in favor of promoting the harm itself?
The answer is yes, but it doesn't matter. Granted, this would be a case where, despite doing an action that is on-balance unjustified, you do not attach greater weight to the reasons in favor of the harm than you ought to. Thus, I grant that in this case, you do not display the "second distinctive fault" mentioned in 3b). Nonetheless, this is not a problem for premise 3), because 3) is restricted to cases in which the harm to which you are committed is itself unjustified. 3b) claims only that if you do an action A with the commitment that A bring about some harm H, then provided neither A nor H is justified, then you display the second distinctive fault of attaching greater weight to the reasons in favor of promoting H than you ought to. Accordingly, Treacherous Self-Defense does not threaten the claim on which the Two Strikes Argument relies.
Premise 4)
Next consider premise 4). Unlike intending a harm, when you merely foresee or know that a given harm will result from your action A, but you are in no way committed to it, then you do not necessarily take there to be any reason in favor of promoting the harm. Rather, the only fault you display is that you are insufficiently repelled by the harm you know A will cause. You do not take there to be any reason to ensure the harm comes to pass, or to make it any more likely than it already is given A. You are not on the lookout for additional steps or adjustments to your conduct that might further raise the probability of the occurrence of the harm. Instead, your only fault is that you are insufficiently repelled by the harm in the sense that you take the reasons in favor of A, namely R+, to outweigh, the reasons against A, namely R-, even though in reality Routweighs R+ (and you should have been motivated accordingly).
Thus, what seems to be going on in Arson 1 is that Alan takes the receipt of $5000 to be a reason in favor of lighting the fire, and he is morally criticizable because he failed to attach sufficient weight to the obvious reason against lighting the fire: namely, that it clearly will result in Victor's death. Either Alan attached no weight to it at all, or he attached far too little weight to it (more precisely, too little weight compared to the fairly minor benefit of getting $5000
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). So in Arson 1, Alan only failed to be sufficiently repelled by the harm he knew his act would cause, but he did not feel any affirmative attraction to, or take there to be positive reasons in favor of, promoting the harm itself. Thus, he displays only one of the distinctive faults Bobby displayed. Now, the obvious objection to line 4) is that merely knowing of or foreseeing a particular harm does not preclude one's seeing it as a good thing that the harm comes to pass, even when one is not committed to it. For example, imagine a version of Arson 1-call it Happy Side Effect-where Alan's only motivating reason for lighting the fire is that he wants the $5000 (just as before). But, in addition, suppose now that he also happens to hate Victor. Accordingly, Alan regards Victor's likely death in the fire as a happy side effect of his starting the fire. Doesn't this
show that in some cases of merely foreseen harm the actor really will feel an affirmative pull towards the harm, and not simply be insufficiently repelled by it, as I have claimed? That would undermine the explanation I am trying to offer of why merely foreseen harm is (all else equal) less culpable than harm to which you are committed.
The answer to this worry can be seen by focusing on what it is for some bit of conduct to manifest insufficient regard. Granted, it is possible to merely foresee harm while at the same time 71 As noted, what matters to culpability is how strong the motivational pressure one feels against the action is compared to the motivational pressure one feels in favor of it.
regarding it as a fortunate side-effect of your conduct. Nonetheless, in cases of merely foreseen harm, to which you are not committed, any positive draw you feel towards the harm will not be doing any work in explaining your conduct and thus will not be manifested in it. Let me explain.
There is a crucial difference between bad character and culpable conduct, and it is only the latter that we are interested in here. After all, it is a fundamental principle of the criminal law that we do not punish merely for bad attitudes or character traits one might possess, but only for conduct that manifests them. Bill's conduct to manifest as much insufficient regard as the lowest amount needed to explain his conduct under the circumstances. Otherwise we would be blaming him just for his bad character,
i.e. based on attitudes that do no work in explaining his conduct.
In general, the thought here is to take the least bad configuration of mental states that would be sufficient to produce the action under the circumstances in question, and then suppose that one's actual action only manifests the insufficient regard associated with those mental states.
Any additional deplorable motives or mental states you might have acted with-while they might impact the badness of your character-are not going to count as manifested in your action.
That, in turn, is because they do not do any work in explaining your action under the circumstances. While mental states that do not help explain your conduct may bear on the condition of your character, they do not affect your culpability for that conduct itself.
This point carries over to Happy Side Effect. There, Alan's dislike of Victor and gladness over the prospect of his death shows that Alan has a deplorable character. But Alan's dislike of Victor nonetheless is not manifested in his lighting the building on fire. Why? Because we do not need to postulate that he feels this motivational pull towards the harm in order to explain why he lit the building on fire in this case. In order to explain it, all we need to appeal to is i) the fact that he took receiving $5000 to count in favor of the action, and ii) that this motivational pull towards the action failed to be outweighed by any motivational repulsion in virtue of the fact that lighting the fire would kill Victor. But to explain Alan's conduct, we do not need also to point to iii) the fact that he is happy to see Victor get killed. Rather, i) and ii) are sufficient to get an actor to perform the action under the circumstances, and iii) is superfluous. Thus, while it's true that Alan's character is shown to be worse by his happiness about Victor's death, the culpability of Alan's conduct only depends on how much insufficient regard it manifests-i.e. on i) and ii). It was supposed to be a case of merely foreseen harm, to which the actor was not committed, but where he still feels some motivational pull towards the harm (i.e. takes it that there are some reasons in favor of promoting the harm). But this leads to contradiction. If we suppose that Alan's lighting the fire was actually partially motivated by his dislike of Victor, then he would be somewhat committed to the death, even though Alan was stipulated not to be committed to it at all. Accordingly, we see that an outcome or state of affairs cannot actually exert motivational pull on you without it also being the case that you are somewhat committed to bringing it about. Thus, if you do an action while merely foreseeing that it will cause harm, then it cannot be the case that the harm actually exerted any motivational pull on you in a way that is necessary to explain your action. For if it did, then you would in fact be somewhat committed to the harm, and so you would no longer qualify as merely foreseeing it.
Hence, it must be the case that in Happy Side Effect, Alan's dislike of Victor is no part of what actually moved him to light the fire, and thus does no work in explaining why he behaved as he did. At best, it is an inert, free-floating sentiment that is not manifested in his lighting the fire. As a result, Alan's dislike of Victor in Happy Side Effect forms no part of the basis for Alan's culpability for his conduct (though it clearly still bears on the quality of his character).
Accordingly, I take it that the point needed for premise 4) has been established. That is, when you merely foresee that harm H will result from your action, but are not committed to it, you either do not take there to be any positive reason in favor of promoting the harm (i.e. experience any motivational pull towards it) or if you have some kind of positive attitude towards the harm (as in Happy Side Effect), then this fact still is not manifested in your action in a way that bears on your culpability for that action. Instead, in cases of merely knowing or foreseen harm, the actor's conduct only manifests an insufficient repulsion from the harm.
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75 Steve Finlay raised the following interesting objection to Premise 4). Suppose in a modified version of Happy Side Effect, Alan would not have started the fire except for the fact that he noticed it would kill specifically Victor, Alan's sworn enemy, and Alan sees this as a good thing. Although an oversimplification, suppose Alan initially felt 10 units of attraction to lighting the fire (in virtue of the money it would get him), but he also felt 11 units of repulsion to it in virtue of the harm it would cause. But his realization that the fire would kill specifically Victor weakens Alan's repulsion to the harm from 11 down to only 9 units. Thus, Alan is now able to light the fire and he does. Here, Alan sees Victor's death as a good thing and it would be genuinely manifested in his conduct (since it is a but-for cause of that conduct), but Alan still would not be committed to Victor's death to any degree. After all, the fact that the victim is Victor only neutralized some of Alan's repulsion to the harm. So we seem to have a counterexample to Premise 4). After all, even though Alan here is supposedly not committed to the death, it seems he still sees positive reasons in favor of the harm itself. Therefore, he would display the second "strike" associated with intended harm. Nonetheless, it seems doubtful that normal human psychology allows it to be simultaneously true that consideration of a harm weakens one's motivational repulsion to it, and that one has no commitment whatsoever to the harm. For this case to be a counterexample to Premise 4), three things must be true: i) the actor has to merely foresee the harm and not be committed to it; ii) he has to do the action in part because it will be harmful (after all, his regarding the harm as good needs to be manifested in his conduct); and iii) he must take there to be positive reasons in favor of the harm itself. But there is tension between i) and iii), at least assuming the actor's psychology is realistic. If an actor saw reasons in favor of the harm itself (here, the fact that the victim is an enemy), and this is manifested in his conduct, then he plausibly would be at least somewhat committed to the harm itself. Commitment, in my sense, involves being inclined to act in ways that make the harm more likely, and being on the lookout for ways to do so. If one really saw reasons in favor of the harm itself, and if this really is sufficient to weaken the
Putting the pieces together
Now we are in a position to see how the conclusion-line 5)-follows from premises 1)-4).
When you do A while merely foreseeing that it will cause harm H, then assuming neither A nor H is justified, you are not sufficiently motivationally repelled by H to prevent you from doing A for whatever reasons you thought counted in favor of it. This manifests some degree of insufficient regard for morally relevant interests. By contrast, when you are committed to H, such that you take there to be positive reasons in favor of promoting it (i.e. when you feel some motivational pull towards steps that would further increase the probability of H occurring), this actually involves two faults. First, you failed to be sufficiently motivationally repelled by Hthat is, in doing A, you failed to regard the harm as as strong a reason against A as you should have. Thus, your action manifests insufficient regard in the same way as what was the case with merely foreseen harm. But in addition, the second fault is that you also wrongly took there to be reasons in favor of promoting H (at least assuming H and A are unjustified). That is, assuming H is not supported by the applicable normative reasons, you either felt some motivational pull towards it when you should not have, or you felt more motivational pull towards H than was warranted by the actual normative reasons in favor of H. This second fault demonstrates an additional amount of insufficient regard for morally relevant interests. Thus, acting from a commitment to the harm manifests insufficient regard and is culpable in two ways, while acting while merely foreseeing the harm manifests insufficient regard and is culpable in just one way.
Therefore, there is one respect in which the former is more culpable than the latter. Hence, DDE NACR holds assuming A and H are unjustified.
repulsion one initially felt towards the harm, then most normal people would also feel some inclination to do things that make the harm more likely and be on the lookout for such harm-promoting steps. That is, they would indeed be at least somewhat committed to the harm. Of course, it might be logically possible to have the sort of psychology that undermines Premise 4). But it seems doubtful that normal humans are actually like this. Such a psychology would seem strangely disjointed and compartmentalized.
Objections
We now have an explanation for why the action in Arson 2 is more culpable than that in Arson 1. I will close by discussing three objections to the Two Strikes Argument. First, one might worry that the argument contains an implicit premise: namely, that the two faults the argument identifies add up to greater culpability than just the one fault by itself. This premise might be questioned. 76 After all, sometimes an action can be faulty in several ways, which do not all contribute distinct amounts of culpability to it. Suppose someone criticizes an action of mine because it not only is an instance of running a red light at a busy intersection, but also because it is a dangerous traffic violation. These two faults seem to collapse into one another, such that the latter fault does not add any more culpability beyond what is already conferred by the first. On the other hand, an action might display genuinely distinct faults that do not collapse into each other. If I promised to scrupulously obey the traffic laws, then my running the red light would not only be a dangerous traffic violation, but it would be a promise-breaking as well. These two faults are distinct, and therefore do seem to confer distinct amounts of culpability. How do we know if the two faults displayed by intentional harming are distinct, rather than collapsible?
The two faults displayed by intentional harming-failing to be sufficiently repelled by the harm and being overly attracted to it-are distinct, I claim, because they are failures of different motivational mechanisms. On the model presupposed by my prior discussion (especially of 3a), it makes sense to think of our motivational machinery as involving both an attraction mechanism and a repulsion mechanism, which have distinct jobs (i.e. different criteria for success). Begin with the attraction mechanism. One of its jobs is to get you to be drawn to the things you should be motivated to bring about, while another aim-more important here-is to avoid generating an attraction to things you shouldn't be motivated to bring about. Thus, when you are attracted to an unjustified harm, which necessarily is something you should not be attracted to, your attraction mechanism misfires. That is one kind of motivational failure. However, it seems we also have a failsafe mechanism for just such an occasion: namely, the repulsion mechanism.
(As any engineer knows, some redundancy is an important part of successful systems design.)
Part of the job of the repulsion mechanism is to repel you from bad states of affairs enough to get you not to bring them about (at least when there is no justification for doing so). Thus, if you perform an action intending to bring about an unjustified harm (and you are rational), we can infer that this failsafe itself has failed. You were not repelled by the harm sufficiently to get you to refrain from the act in question. The amount of repulsion to harming that is required in a given case depends in part on how much overt attraction you have towards the harm. If your repulsion mechanism does not produce the amount of repulsion needed to get you to refrain from the harmful action, it has failed to do its job, and this is a distinct kind of failure from the misfiring of the attraction mechanism.
Thus, when you act intending to cause harm, there appear to be two different mechanisms that fail-one involving attraction, the other involving repulsion. The mechanisms are fairly seen as distinct given that they have different jobs. Thus, their failings are distinct, and do not appear to collapse. This is the reason to think the culpability of both faults identified by the Two Strikes Argument add up to more culpability than either one alone.
A second objection to the Two Strikes Argument is that there might seem to be no guarantee that those who intentionally cause harm are more culpable than similarly situated actors who cause analogous harms only knowingly. Consider the following variation of Arson 1 & 2.
Suppose Charlie (just like Alan) lights the fire for $5000 despite knowing that it will kill Victor.
Moreover, Dan (just like Bobby) lights the fire intending to kill Victor in order to get the $5000.
But now suppose that Dan regards Victor's death as deeply troubling and sees it as a strong reason not to light the fire. Although he proceeds to set fire to the building, he does so with strong reservations. (Perhaps he thinks he really needs the $5000.) By contrast, Charlie, who merely foresees that the fire will kill Victor, feels no reservations whatsoever about Victor's death. Charlie couldn't care less that Victor will die. Given that Charlie thus seems extremely callous, while Dan seems somewhat less callous, one might conclude that intentionally harming is not always more culpable than analogous acts of causing harm knowingly.
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This objection admits of two answers. First, my aim in this paper is only to argue that there is one respect in which intending harm is more culpable than bringing about a similar harm only knowingly, and this holds even for Charlie and Dan. After all, while Charlie's and Dan's respective actions share one culpability enhancing feature (i.e. neither was sufficiently repelled by the harm to get them to refrain from starting the fire), Dan's action also manifests insufficient regard, and thus is culpable, in a second way. Because Dan is committed to the harm (and thus is on the lookout for steps he might take to promote its occurrence, etc.), we know he took there to be positive reasons in favor of the harm itself that he regarded as sufficient grounds for bringing it about, even though by hypothesis there were no reasons sufficient to justify the harm. By contrast, Charlie's conduct does not display this second fault, since he merely caused the harm knowingly and was not committed to it. Accordingly, Dan's conduct has one culpabilityenhancing feature that Charlie's lacks. Thus, even if Charlie is on-balance more culpable than Dan, this is compatible with the conclusion I am arguing for here. 78 Thanks to Jon Quong for pressing me on cases of this kind.
The second answer is that the case is under-described because it does not mention the On the other hand, we might flesh out the case so that all else is equal. But then Charlie's conduct would not be more culpable than Dan's (even if Charlie's character might still be worse). Thus, suppose that the benefits sought by both are the same-e.g. $5000 just for personal amusement. This would show that both Charlie and Dan are so unconcerned with the value of Victor's life that it only takes the promise of $5000 to get them to be willing to accept his death.
Granted, Charlie was said to be a callous fellow who is even less concerned with Victor's life what Bobby did (intentionally kill without justification) is more culpable than what Alan did (knowingly cause death without justification).
Conclusion: The Closeness Problem Redux
I have defended an argument in favor of a restricted, non-absolute, culpability-based version of the doctrine of double effect, which I dubbed DDE NACR . This provides a rationale for the top tier of the criminal law's culpability hierarchy, and explains why it makes sense to sometimes attach heavier sanctions to crimes (like treason) that require purposefully, not just knowingly, bringing about a bad state of affairs. My argument, as an agent-centered rationale, promises to do a better job than the means rationale of providing a complete normative foundation for the way in which the criminal law actually encodes DDE.
81
Of course, this still leaves the closeness problem. I have not tried to fully solve it.
Admittedly, DDE NACR will not be completely defensible until we have a principled way to distinguish intended and merely foreseen effects. However, at the very least my agent-centered rationale for DDE NACR is no worse off on this score than the means rationale, which itself requires that we can distinguish between using (or intending to use) others as means and merely affecting people more indirectly.
What is more, my explanation for why purposeful misconduct is more culpable than merely knowing misconduct (assuming there are no relevant justifications and all else is equal) also provides some practical guidance in distinguishing the two categories from one another. I argued 81 Another question I have not addressed is why the criminal law often declines to single out the purposeful version of some type of misconduct for harsher treatment than the merely knowing version of that conduct. (Tort law, by contrast, collapses this distinction. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 8A (1965) .) Perhaps part of the explanation rests on the assumption that once some threshold of culpability is passed that triggers the harshest penalties the law has available-as is the case with murder-it's no longer necessary to distinguish purpose from knowledge. Thus, knowingly killing might surpass the threshold of culpability needed to merit the harshest penalties. But then we need to explain why treason, which also can trigger severe penalties, does distinguish purpose from knowledge. Maybe since treason can be committed without anything as bad as killing, only the purposeful version of this misconduct passes the threshold needed to trigger the harshest penalties. However, more work is needed here.
that acting with purpose to bring about a bad or wrongful state of affairs is pro tanto more culpable than doing so merely knowingly because the former involves a certain type of commitment, which the latter lacks. Accordingly, to distinguish purposeful from merely knowing misconduct, what we need to look for is evidence of this type of commitment. Thus, evidence will be probative of whether the defendant intended a given harm, as opposed to merely foreseeing it, when this evidence tends to show that the defendant was motivated to promote the occurrence of this state of affairs under the circumstances. Did the defendant commit the crime in a way that made the occurrence of the bad state of affairs more likely than other ways she easily could have committed the crime instead? Was she on the lookout for ways to increase the chances that the bad state of affairs would occur? Evidence indicating an affirmative answer to such questions is evidence that the defendant was committed to the bad state of affairs in the relevant sense. Accordingly, this is one crucial type of evidence we need to look for to decide if a defendant manifested both kinds of fault that make intending harm worse than foreseeing it.
In this way, my argument has the added benefit of giving some practical advice for how to decide whether a defendant should be treated as a purposeful or a merely knowing actor. This, in turn, helps make progress in dealing with the closeness problem as it is likely to come up in legal contexts. Because of this and the other advantages of my defense of DDE NACR , we have reason to be optimistic that the doctrine of double effect as actually employed in the criminal law can be placed on a sound normative foundation.
